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Abstract   
China’s recent collective forestry property rights reform (CFPRR) is regarded as the third 
Land Reform and has been implemented to accelerate China’s rural restructuring. In departing 
from previous top-down policy changes, the CFPRR has focused on local collective practices 
and actions. It indicates a shift in China’s rural governance, away from direct intervention 
towards support for local collective actions. Based on a case study of Hongtian Village, the 
origin of the CFPRR, this article analyzes the process of insinuating collective action and the 
impact that this has had in creating a new cultural understanding and acceptance of collective 
forestry property rights. In contrast to the relative insecurity of tenure that can accompany 
many reforms of the governance of common pool resources, the paper suggests that the 
success of the ‘Hongtian model’ mainly lies in high levels of process engagement by local 
people and effective interaction between villagers and the government. While not addressing 
all the issues associated with the inefficiency of the previous collective approach to forestry, 
the paper suggests that there are many transferable lessons to be learnt from the CFPRR, both 
within and beyond China.  
Keyword: collective ownership; collective forests; collective action; forestry property rights; 
China. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to bring into conversation three enduring themes of research in Land Use 
Policy: the governance and management of common pool resources (Behnke et al., 2016; 
Rasch et al., 2016; Reyes-Bueno et al., 2016; Vij and Narain, 2016); new approaches to 
effective forest management (Brandt et al., 2016; Burns et al., 2016); and questions about 
rural development in China (Long et al., 2012; Rao et al., 2016). This is on the basis that 
forestry is probably more important in China than it is in any other country in the World. This 
is in part because of the sheer diversity of forest ecosystems, in part because China’s forests 
make a significant input to local economic activity and provide a significant proportion of 
energy for heating rural households, and in part because they are a scarce resource in terms of 
timber volume per capita (Harkness, 1998; Han et al., 2014). This multiple economic, social 
and environmental role has meant that there has long been a struggle to achieve a balance 
between timber production and forest protection. Indeed, the balance has rarely been 
achieved, with China having experienced several periods of deforestation driven by economic 
incentives from governments, which has led to serious environmental problems such as soil 
erosion and increased flooding (Wang, 2002).  
 
Even though the Government has begun to enhance the protection of state-owned natural 
forests, the demands for timber products have continued to increase in line with the nation’s 
economic growth (White, 2006). This means that the pressure to harvest timber has 
increasingly been concentrated on collectively-owned forests, which are mainly plantation 
forests managed  by local communities (Sun & Shen, 2001). However, the average output 
from these collective plantation forests is very low. The typical value of forestry crops from 
these plantations is  only ￥20 per mu,1 compared with ￥686 for arable land. The per hectare 
stock of collective plantation forests is also low, at around 30M3, compared to an average of 
77 M3 for China’s forests, 100 M3 globally, and about 150350 M3 in developed countries such 
as France and Germany (FRA, 2015). This situation clearly constrains the ability of rural 
communities to enjoy the economic development that their forests are capable of providing. 
 
Many observers, both policy makers and scholars (such as Huang, 2005; Dai et al., 2002), 
                                                        
1 Chinese currency, about￥6.5 =$1, 15 mu = 1 hectare. 
attribute these problems to the ambiguity and inefficiency of collective property rights. Their 
views seem to be informed by Hardin’s (1968) conception of the “the tragedy of the 
commons” in which self-interested villagers maximize their own benefits from the ‘common’ 
forests, which leads to degradation and ruin of the common. Superficially there does seem to 
be merit in this argument with respect to China, where centralized forestry management has 
proved to be inefficient by allowing all kinds of government agencies to make decisions that 
benefit them, while denying a stake to local people and those with management expertise 
(Liu et al., 2004).  
 
The classic remedy for this situation has been to argue for the imposition of better control, 
either via the state or the market (Demsetz, 1967; Johnson, 1972; Smith, 1981; Cheung, 
1970). However, many empirical studies have found that neither is uniformly successful in 
constructing a sustainable natural management mechanism because, as Ostrom et al. (1999) 
have argued, institutions such as the commons are not singularly predisposed to particular 
management regimes. Instead, there has been much interest in the potential for ‘third way’ 
local collective action to address the multiple issues involved in managing China’s forest 
commons by harnessing the claimed benefits of both government control and market 
solutions (see Hobley & Shah, 1996; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988; 
Hanna et al., 1995; Pinkerton & Weinstein, 1995). However, common pool resource-based 
activities vary a lot due to differences between institutions, community structures, household 
needs and market opportunities (Marschke et.al, 2012), meaning that there are no ‘one size 
fits all’ solutions (Barry & Meinzen-Dick, 2008; German & Keeler, 2010), while little is yet 
known about the impacts of the actual processes involved in implementing collective action 
at the local level (Steins, 1999).  
 
While there has been some forestry policy decentralization in China since the 1990s, it is 
clear that lessons still need to be learned in terms of successful collective action. In this 
article we look back at the changes that have occurred in Chinese forestry policy, as a context 
for examining recent efforts to develop a localized market economy in forestry, through a 
programme of collective forestry property rights reform. Based on a case study in Hongtian 
Village, Fujian Province, Southern China, we examine the background of the reform, its 
process and the role of collective action in bringing it to fruition. In particular, we want to 
explore the extent to which conventional analyses, that place collective approaches as a third 
solution besides government intervention and privatization (Steins, 1999), transfer to the 
opposite situation, as found in China, of the decollectivization of an overly bureaucratic and 
inefficient form of collective forestry. While there is little doubt that collective action does 
offer an alternative, we seek to argue that this is less about structure and more about the 
nature of the collective action itself, especially whether the shareholders, such as the local 
villagers, were able to make their own decisions, deal with their own conflicts, and enhance 
the bottom up collective decision themselves. From this understanding of the agentive power 
of collective action we seek to conclude that property rights reforms that support collective 
action have the potential to be successful in China, in social, economic and environmental 
terms, and that this finding is significant beyond the Chinese case.  
 
Forestland ownership and management in China 
 
Forest ownership and management in China has very much reflected the country’s social and 
political situation. Before the Revolution, for example, forests were mostly privately owned. 
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), forest lands were confiscated 
and redistributed to peasants in the First Land Reform before being brought into a 
collectivized regime in order to intensify timber production (Menzies, 1994). Initially, forest 
lands remained in individual ownership, although production decisions were made 
collectively, but after 1956 the ownership of land – including forests - was transferred to a 
local Collective. Rapid collectivization continued during the Great Leap Forward Movement 
(1958-1960), with about 34 Advanced (regional) Cooperatives united into the one People’s 
Commune nationwide, which lasted for about 20 years (Liu, 2001; Yang, 2002). 
 
One of the impacts of these changes was serious deforestation, due to the intensifying of 
production and a lack of incentives and foresight to replant and maintain the plantations (Yin, 
1998; Ho, 2006). This eventually led to a further adjustment in property rights, with a three-
level ownership regime established around the People’s Commune, regional Production 
Brigades and local Production Teams, with the last of these forming the basic unit of 
management (Wang, 1998; Ho, 2001). This regime lasted from 1961 to the early 1980s, 
during which time some production teams developed very strong communal oversight of 
their land, effectively bringing together a form of collective ownership as well as 
management. 
 
After China’s Reform and Opening up in 1981, the Second Land Reform took place under 
which arable land was distributed to households under a form of private land tenure known as 
the Household Responsibility System. The People’s Commune was dismantled rapidly and 
was replaced by Xiang (the same as townships), while the Production Brigades were 
realigned into Administrative Villages (AV). The Production Teams either remained as part of 
the AV, or were changed into Villager Groups, although in many cases they lost control over 
their lands, with the legal power of the collective vested in the Administrative Villages (Ho, 
2001). The same reforms did not apply to forestlands, however. Forestry property rights were 
largely kept unchanged, with households allowed only a small piece of freehold forestland 
(about 1 mu2 per capita). The remaining forestlands were held through existing contracts and 
tenure regimes, with the Government extracting most of the financial benefits from the 
forests, principally in terms of taxes and fees. These routinely accounted for over 50% of the 
timber price (Xu et al., 2006), and in some regions up to 70% (Li, 2000). Government also 
regulated timber harvesting and sales. A logging ban was placed on natural forests in 1984 
and, under the Centrally Determined Allowable Cutting Quota System introduced in 1987, all 
non-government organizations had to apply for a cutting quota before undertaking any 
commercial harvesting. In complying with other regulations as well, the net benefit to forest 
owners of harvesting their timber was probably negative if the labour input was calculated at 
opportunity cost.  
 
Unlike agrarian reform, the interpretation of forestry policies varied across China. Provinces 
such as Hunan, Guangdong and Jiangxi attempted to introduce agricultural contract systems 
into forestry, by releasing the management of collective forests to individual households. 
However, this resulted in mass illegal and premature cutting of over 1 million ha of forests in 
Southern China, as these households sought to realise the value of the timber under their 
control before the policy was modified or changed (Liu and Ping, 1990). Other provinces, 
such as Fujian for example, tried to modify collective management arrangements by 
establishing a new system, called ‘Share Holding Integrated Forest Tenure’ (SHIFT) (Song et 
al., 1997). Under SHIFT, a Forestry Board was elected within every AV and was responsible 
for collective forest management. Villagers held shares and received a share of net profits. 
The SHIFT was successful in maintaining the stability of collective forests, and was soon 
extended to other provinces and became the most popular regime in China (Song et al., 
                                                        
2 mu, Chinese unit, 1 ha= 15mu. 
2004). However, despite its popularity the SHIFT system was far from efficient in terms of 
the operation of property rights. This was because the legal boundaries of the rights were 
often unclear, while the cost of establishing physical boundaries was high compared to the 
value that could be generated from harvesting the timber. As a result, many unofficial 
agreements were reached about the boundaries between different households, or even among 
AVs, and many boundary conflicts were reported, including 55 in 2004 alone (Yong’an 
Forestry Bureau, personal communication).  
Table 1 Summary of the property rights shift in China’s forest lands 
Historical Periods Forestry land Forestry crops 
Before 1949 
A mixed economy of private 
ownership (for both 
investment and occupation) 
and public forestlands, mainly 
owned by national and local 
governments, and rural 
communities. 
Broadly the same pattern as land 
ownership, although the private 
investment land was rented to 
farmers who planted and owned the 
trees,  while the landlords owned the 
land. 
the First land reform 
(1949-1952) 
A dual economy of State 
forests, which were in 
national ownership and were 
run by State forestry farms, 
and small private forests 
owned by farmers. The main 
difference from the previous 
regime was thus that private 
investment lands were taken 
from landlords and distributed 
to individual farmers 
There was no longer any separation 
between the ownership of the land 
and of the crops growing on the land  
The collective 
economy （1953-
1981) 
The ownership of the State 
forests remained unchanged. 
However, the forests in 
private ownership gradually 
shifted from individual 
farmers to the collective 
( tothe Production Team at 
first, and then gradually to the 
People's Commune) 
No change from the First land 
reform: the land and crops were 
treated as a single ownership.  
the second Land 
Reform (19812-
1998) 
Very little change in 
ownership structure, although  
as the dismantling of rural 
communities took hold,  
control over the collective 
forestland was less effective 
The situation with the State forest 
land and crops remained unchanged. 
However, management of some areas 
of collective forest was distributed to 
households in some provinces, 
leading to serious deforestation. Thus 
the collective land ownership 
remained but with much worse 
collective management and 
uncontrolled (and often unstoppable) 
illegal logging. 
The CFPRR （1999-
） 
No change in the structure of 
land ownership -. 
State forests remain unchanged. 
-The timber in the collective forests 
has been distributed among villagers 
with various localized plans and 
levels of villager participation.  
 
By the 1990s, the desire for a new approach to forest management had become clear. The 
importance of forestry property rights had been widely accepted by the Chinese Government, 
which was eager to introduce a market mechanism into forestry, and then to develop an 
advanced forestry industry to meet the demand for timber. Therefore, the goal was to 
establish a forestry property rights regime fit for a market economy and, specifically, to 
clarify the property rights between the collective and villagers. There was, however, no 
established model of how to achieve this institutional shift within the type of centralised 
regime found in China. This was largely because the application of collective action in 
previous research had mainly focused on setting up effective regimes rather than de-
collectivizing them in favour of new common property rights regimes (Ostrom, 1990; 
Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Gibson et al, 2000; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).  
 
Despite the lack of research, the forest property rights reform started in 1998, in Hongtian 
Village in Fujian Province, Southern China. In common with the Second Land Reform, it was 
a based on a bottom-up approach to allocating rights, but with support from the government 
of Yong’an City (the local authority) from the start. This support included authorizing 
villagers to make their own plans for distributing property rights as part of a deliberative 
process that was designed, implemented and monitored by the villagers themselves. This was 
completely at odds with the processes used elsewhere and by higher government authorities. 
Different kinds of villager meetings were held, with many villagers volunteering to follow the 
whole process of implementation. Although no official monitoring was put in place, some 
academics have taken an interest from the start (see Dai and Xu, 2002), meaning that there is 
now some evidence of both the process and the outcomes of implementing the reforms. 
Given that the process used in Hongtian Village has been considered successful enough to be 
replicated elsewhere in China, our research question examines the extent to which the 
‘Hongtian model’ represents a new approach to common property rights that facilitates an 
element of decentralisation and exposure to conventional markets while maintaining suitable 
environmental and social safeguards.  In selecting this research question we wish to build on 
Ostrom et al.’s (1991) claims about the potential for adopting new regimes for managing 
common pool resources such as China’s state forests: 
 
Participants are more likely to adopt effective rules in macro-regimes that 
facilitate their efforts than in regimes that ignore resource problems entirely or 
that presume that central authorities must make all decisions. If local authority is 
not formally recognized by larger regimes, it is difficult for users to establish 
enforceable rules. On the other hand, if rules are imposed by outsiders without 
consulting local participants, local users may engage in a game of “cops and 
robbers” with outside authorities. (Ostrom et al., 1999: p.281) 
 
While being specific to forest policy in China, this research question has a wider application 
in considering how new forms of community-based collective action may be able to offer a 
bridge between state control and market innovation. Of particular significance here is the 
challenge that this case offers for conventional approaches to co-operative collective action, 
which are based on an assumption that, over time, the commons will be replaced by private 
property rights (Thompson, 1991; Ostrom et al, 1999; Krier, 2008). While this may have been 
the dominant outcome in many previous attempts to improve the efficiency of property rights, 
both Krier (2008) and Ostrom et al. (1999) have argued that it is equally possible for new 
legal conventions to emerge from individual and community actions – that rights in property 
can take multiple forms that may combine the commonality of the old system with new 
individualized conventions that facilitate more efficient resource use. For Krier (2008), such 
approaches are based on an expectation that these legal conventions will be recognized, such 
that the expectation gives rise to particular forms of (social and management) practice, which 
further underpin the expectations. This implies a level of stability and gradual change that 
avoids the denial of common claims but allows individual initiative to be insinuated into new 
forms of social practice and governance.   
 
Methodology  
 
A single case study approach was used to generate the data. This approach was chosen 
because the reforms were implemented through a politico-spatially referenced programme 
that was rolled out one village at a time. Hongtian Village was selected as the case study 
because it was one of the first in the reform programme, and the most successful case that a 
community-based bottom-up approach was taken to collective forestry property rights 
reform. Not only did this mean that there was a substantial time-series of data available, but it 
also meant that there were a lot of official documents and reports, while key villagers were 
also used to being interviewed and researched.  
 
Hongtian Village is located in Yong’an City, in the middle of Fujian Province, one of the most 
forested provinces in China. It comprises seven villager groups in three natural villages, with  
821 villagers in 223 households. In common with other villages in Yong’an City, it is highly 
forested: total farmland was only 1017 mu (about 68 ha), while the collective forestland was 
about 18908 mu (about 1260 ha). Around half of the forestland in Hongtian Village 
comprises plantation forestry under collective control and used for timber production. 
Approximately  one-third of the forestland is state-owned and has been designated  by local 
government as ecological forest that cannot be harvested. Most of the remaining forest area is  
owned by the collective but is protected  from any kind of utilization. There are also some  
bamboo forests and fruit forests where the land is owned by the collective and the bamboos 
and trees are owned and managed by private individuals.  
 
The document collation was undertaken in collaboration with the Forestry Bureau of Yong’an 
City, and included archival material from both local and upper level governments and 
transcripts of meetings, workshops and symposia that had taken place as the reforms were 
being implemented. All documents and transcripts were subject to deep reading by one of the 
authors, with key themes used to inform a series of 48 face to face semi-structured interviews 
that took place between April and August 2005. The sampling frame for the interviews was 
drawn up according to three principal criteria: to include people who were known to have 
been instrumental in the reform process; to include those who had been identified from 
previous field investigations; and to include those recommended by the local government.  
Interviewees included village cadres and reputable old farmers who were active during the 
initial reform period, current village leaders, government officials and officers of the Forestry 
Bureau. In addition, interviews were undertaken with a random sample of villagers. The lead 
author has returned to the village at regular intervals since the original work, to build up a 
longer-term picture of the impact of the reforms.  
 
Findings 
 
Benefit distribution was at the core of the reform, complicated by the fact that some logging 
contracts (signed in the 1980s for about 20 years, due in 2003) remained in place, for some 
villagers, while other villagers needed new contracts. Few villagers felt any association with 
the collective forests, or were prepared to take care of the forests, as described by one village 
leader: 
 
[At that time] ... the collective forest was badly managed; [it] would have been 
completely lost if no change took place. ... [for example] when there was a forest 
fire, we called the villagers to help raise the alarm. But few responded. They 
moved lackadaisically, and asked for payment before doing anything. (Lai, Head 
of the Village Committee) 
  
As this suggests, many villagers were disinterested in the forests and felt that they needed an 
incentive to get involved. This dissociation led to other problems, as described by another 
village leader:   
 
There was so much illegal logging at that time. It was impossible to stop them. 
Many villagers were involved. It was embarrassing for the Village cadres to catch 
them, as they were blamed privately ... Finally, the cadres refused to chase, 
leaving [two of us] constantly on guard and with little effect. If this continued, all 
of the forest would have been lost very soon. (Deng, Village Secretary of CPC) 
 
This combination of apathy and illegal activity meant that many people had little interest in 
supporting the reforms. Many conflicts thus arose in the reform process, particularly between 
those with current contracts and those wanting the new ones. These were the most serious 
conflicts to be resolved throughout Yong’an City because both sides - households with many 
forests and households with few forests - had legal authority to support their claims. In 
addition, the poor distribution of contracts in the 1980s and varied management quality 
thereafter led to many conflicts about the physical boundaries of contracted areas, which 
made the situation more complicated. Some villagers appropriated large areas of good forest 
illegally, while some old village cadres got larger shares mainly because they picked up the 
worst land at that time in order to benefit others and managed the forest land much better than 
other villagers:  
 
Most of our collective forests are bamboos, with three different periods of 
allocation. The first one was distributed to households in the 1980s. At that time 
there was little profit, thus few conflicts arose. [As the prices of forest products 
increase rapidly], some people wanted to reallocate when previous contracts 
ended. … there was serious conflicts between two villager groups: one grew 
bamboo on the other’s forestland, and both claimed the ownership of the land. … 
there have been group fights several times, and even the Police can’t stop them. 
The second allocation involved the collectively managed forests. They used to be 
distributed to each village group via 10-year contracts. … The forests were 
divided into 11 parcels by their natural boundaries, from 100 mu to 300 mu, and 
randomly distributed to 11 village groups by lottery. … Our village group, with a 
population of more than 160 - the second largest in the Village, picked the 
smallest parcel. The conflicts were intense. (Villager from nearby village, male) 
 
Hongtian’s attempt at reform started from the grass roots, based on questions about the 
distribution of use rights (see Figure 1). Benefit distribution among the villagers was thus 
focused on three aspects: whether to divide the use of the forests or to sell the rights and 
divide the money; how to divide the land or money among the villagers – who qualified for a 
share; and what provision should be made for future population change? In addition, 
decisions had to be made about the allocation to those with existing contracts. To start with, 
the reform proposals were made during informal meetings between villagers and village 
cadres, and launched by the Village Committee. Then detailed information was collected at 
the Village scale. Villager Representative Meetings (VRM) were held to negotiate the 
allocation of the forests; these included the leaders of production teams, thus ensuring that the 
interests of the villagers were protected. After a draft or a modification was made, a 
Household Representative Meeting (HRM) would be held with the relevant community or 
production team at which the modification could be agreed, or alternatives proposed. This 
circular process would continue until a modified plan was accepted by all the village 
communities or production teams.  
 
In addressing the conflicts raised between those with and without existing contracts, it was 
recognised that the conflicts in Hongtian Village were not as serious as in some other AVs, 
largely because the distribution of use rights in the collective forests in the previous contracts 
had been relatively even and little had changed since, while the contracts had almost expired 
by the time the process started. In addition, it was clear that the degradation of the forests 
caused by illegal logging was so serious that if nothing were changed, the whole village 
would lose huge profits. Therefore, it was agreed that all previous contracts would be 
terminated, with compensation of ￥7.5-15 per hectare paid according to the quality of 
management in each of the contracted areas.  
 
With the contractual issue addressed, the most significant conflict encountered in the reform 
was about the redistribution of rights, which focused on who qualified for a share - a problem 
that had hardly happened in the past. According to China’s Household Registration System 
(Hukou), an individual’s membership of an AV is justified by his or her Hukou. In the past, 
the Hukou System prevented people from migrating, meaning that AV membership was 
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Figure 1 Process of Collective Action 
stable. However, due to the impact of urbanization and decentralization, the Hukou System 
had loosened rapidly, and residential conditions in an AV had become more diversified. For 
example, some households had moved to an urban area but had retained their village 
registration. In other cases, women had married and moved into a new household without 
transferring her Hukou. Since only Hukou members qualified for a share of the use of the 
forests, the question of who should be regarded as a qualified member became a major issue. 
Some of those who had moved some time ago returned to claim their shares, while others 
who left for higher education or military service faced a loss of their share because they had 
moved their Hukou away (as was required by law).  
 
These issues were exacerbated by a feeling that those returning from the cities were already 
wealthy and now wanted to deprive those who had stayed of what should rightly have been 
theirs. This certainly encouraged villagers to get involved in the allocation process, through 
which they managed to secure certain concessions that meant that people living in the village, 
even without Hukou, qualified for a share, whereas those who had left lost their share, even if 
their Hukou remained in the village. The exception to this was that those who moved their 
Hukou for education or military service did not lose their share, and remained qualified. 
 
A good indicator for the villagers’ involvement might be the frequency of the VRMs. Even 
though no one maintained a record of how many meetings they had, many villagers reported 
that there were more meetings in the first year of the process (1998) than in the previous 20 
years. It was estimated that at least 14 meetings were held specifically to decide the final 
plan, including 3 Villager Meetings, 3 VRMs, 3 meetings of leaders of natural villages or 
production teams, 4 meeting of village cadres, and 1 meeting of members of the Communist 
Party. Informal meetings and other negotiations were countless. One community member 
remembered it thus: 
 
In 1998, we held more than 20 Village committee meeting and villager group 
meetings, to find a solution. Some suggested that the collective forest be divided 
by household, in the same way as the farming land. Some were afraid because 
there were no supporting laws. Some denied the process because they preferred 
illegal logging and didn’t want things to change. I was stubborn and said ‘nobody 
can leave without a consensus.’ Finally, with the final vote, about 80% of the 
village cadres and villager representatives agreed to divide the collective forests 
between households. (Deng, Village Secretary of CPC) 
 
(After the decision to reform was made) Rough plans were made by the Village 
Committee, and the leaders of the villager group and villager representatives were 
responsible to take it back to their villager group, and to organize household 
meetings for discussion. All villagers’ opinions were taken back to the Village 
Committee for discussion. There were many rounds like this…. The final plan 
was passed in the Villager Representative Meetings (with at least 2/3 of 
representatives’ support) (Deng, Village Secretary of CPC) 
 
Although time-consuming, this process was felt to have been a success, in bringing all groups 
into the decision process. As the Reform was closely linked with the villagers’ personal 
benefits, most of them wanted to participate, to ensure that their opinions were widely 
known, and that they could gain support for their views from others. For example, when the 
evaluation and distribution of collective forests was going on, almost every household 
followed the whole process. It was not only the first time that the villagers had a clear 
understanding of the quality of the forests, but it was also their chance to make sure that they 
would not lose out in the distribution. Hongtian’s bottom up collective action experience was 
also supported by the government and was emphasized as a suitable process throughout the 
Reform. Of course, much remained to be done in terms of implementing the new benefit 
distribution. Given the past top-down policy failures, the implementation of reforms had 
always been distorted by different interest groups seeking to secure benefits for themselves. 
Implementation was thus understood to be the key to ensuring equality and fairness.  
 
The Hongtian villagers managed, as part of the reform process, to make detailed requirements 
about the way in which the decisions would be implemented. Figure 2 illustrates the 
implementation process.  
 
 
The first stage was to establish an Evaluation Board (E-Board) consisting of reputable and 
experienced farmers, village cadres and village representatives, which was responsible for 
classifying the quantity and quality of the forests. With the help of technicians from the Town 
Forestry Station, the E-Board managed to clarify all the boundaries of the collective forests. 
Afterwards, all the available collective forests were classified into good, medium and poor 
ones. Then large parcels of forest were divided into smaller pieces, and a bundle of each in 
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the good, the medium and the poor categories was combined to make sure that the average 
value of each lot was the same. The actual distribution of the lots was decided by a lottery, 
which avoided any lingering suspicion that some people were favoured over others.  
 
With the allocation of the forestlands sorted, the reform next had to consider how to allocate 
the remaining collective responsibilities, which included the development and maintenance of 
infrastructure and the maintenance of the ecological forests. At the core of the reform process 
was a commitment to balancing rights and responsibilities, to ensure that the forests would be 
effectively managed in the future. Thus, even though the collectives were authorized to keep 
up to 10 per cent of the use rights of the collective forests as a means of generating income, 
their leaders knew that the collectives would face serious deficit after the distribution, if there 
were no corresponding distribution of responsibilities. Following many discussions, it was 
decided that Hongtian’s need for public finance would be considered in both the short and 
longer terms.  
 
The availability of short term finance depended on the division of benefit between the 
collective and the villagers. Provision for this had previously been made in the original forest 
contracts, and these provisions were extended to the new contracts. These provisions meant 
that the proceeds of the harvest of current forests under individual management would be 
divided according to a ratio of 3 (the collective):7 (the villager); for new forests, the ratio 
would be 2 (the collective):8 (the villager).  The dividends were calculated according to the 
volume of timber harvested, with the financial value based on timber prices at the time of 
sale. In addition, both the collective and the villagers agreed on conditions to ensure that they 
received a fair share of the benefits. These conditions included basic requirements for output, 
according to the quality of forestland. If the output achieved was lower than the basic 
requirement for the quality of the forest, the dividend to the collective would be calculated 
according to the fixed output instead of the output achieved, thus penalizing poor 
management and harvesting practices. To balance this, it was agreed that the forests would 
not be reallocated again in the short to medium term, with the new contracts having a 
duration of 30 years. Provision was made, however, to adjust the villagers’ share of dividends 
should the need arise. It was also agreed that the AV’s finances should be open to public 
inspection, that surplus public finance should be redistributed every 5 years, and that large 
expenditures should be formally approved in the VRM. 
 
In addition to the apportionment of harvest proceeds, it was also decided that the public 
finances would be underpinned in the longer term by the collection of forestland rents 
because of course the lands were still in collective ownership. However, the system for 
deciding on rental levels and payment mechanisms has not yet been developed in a 
comprehensive sense. This is because the current Village Committee has enjoyed a more 
substantial income from harvest dividends than it did prior to the reform, meaning that it has 
not needed the rental income. When asked about the future of the rental collection, a member 
of the village cadre admitted that there would be considerable trouble if one villager refused 
to hand in the rent, because others would follow and there is currently no agreed method of 
enforcement. However, he did not worry about this, because he was in charge for only 3 
years.  
 
Another responsibility was about how to share the maintenance cost of the ecological forests, 
which were still kept in collective ownership and management because no one would take on 
the management of these forests due to the strict logging ban. Before the Reform, the 
collective paid for the management of the ecological forests, including employing forest 
guards. In keeping with the balance being sought between rights and responsibilities, it was 
decided that responsibility for the ecological forests should be assigned to those who received 
shares in the collective forest, with the level of commitment based on the number of shares 
owned. If there was any loss in the ecological forests, the collective forest share owners had 
to compensate the loss from the proceeds of their timber forests. For example, those taking 10 
shares of collective forests have the responsibility to take care of 10 shares of the ecological 
forests. If the ecological forests were illegally harvested by 1 M3 of timber, the person in 
charge had to pay the collective 10 M3 of timber from their share of the collective forest. By 
this mechanism, the maintenance of the ecological forests was continued after the Reform. 
 
The Success of the Hongtian Village scheme came as a surprise to the local government and 
other AVs, largely because it was built on the agency of local people rather than relying on 
bureaucratic structures and rigid commands. Soon the ‘Hongtian model’ was widely adopted 
by all the AVs in Yong’an, with more than 95 per cent of the county’s collective forests being 
brought into the reform process by the end of 2004. In 2005, the State Forestry 
Administration (SFA) expanded the model nation-wide, with the same reform initiated in 
state forestry the year afterwards.  
 
As this suggests, public confidence in forestry policy has improved, in all sectors of society, 
which has underpinned a growth in new planting as well as in forestland maintenance. 
Perhaps even more importantly, illegal logging has all but vanished in areas subject to the 
reform, and has apparently ceased completely in Hongtian Village. Although it is not clear 
why this has happened, villagers claim that it has come about as a result of better 
management and protection of forests by share owners, allied to the greater possibility for 
individuals to earn income legitimately through the operation of the forest contracts. Better 
forest management and greater income potential from well-managed forests has also led to 
better fire prevention and fire fighting. Once the reform was underway, the Hongtian villagers 
voluntarily formed a Forest Protection and Fire Prevention Association to shoulder the 
responsibility for all kinds of fire fighting. This was replicated elsewhere, with 15 
associations formed by 2006 (4 at township level and 11 at AV level). 
 
Figure 3 Investment on collective forestry indicated by new planting areas (2001-2005) 
 
Another indicator of long term confidence in the new arrangements was the investment that 
took place. This was especially clear in terms of the new planting, given the lapse of time 
between planting and harvest.  According to the statistical data from Yong’an City, before the 
Reform, both the private sector and the collective farms were reluctant to invest in planting 
on collective forestry lands, even in cases where they were under a legal obligation to do so 
following the harvest of timber. In 1999, the overall size of the privately-owned plantations 
was only 1965 mu, about 27.6% of the total area of collective forestry land. The state-owned 
company, which used to rent over 200,000 mu of collective forestland at a very cheap price, 
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undertook most of the  new planting on the collective forestland. However, this changed after 
the reform. As illustrated in Figure 3, investment in new planting by the private sector 
increased rapidly after the Reform; by 2003, for example, it had reached 16821 mu, 
equivalent to about 90.5% of the total plantation on collective forestry lands. In addition, the 
value of the collective forestry lands also increased substantially, with the average annual rent 
increasing from ￥5 per mu in 1998 to ￥20 per mu in 2003. Many villagers subsequently 
expressed their regret that they did not bid a higher rental price in order to secure some of the 
forestland:   
 
I saw the Notice for bidding of the forestry land…There were about 20 villagers 
joining the bid, and the bottom price was ￥9 per mu annually…I knew clearly 
that the rent used to be ￥5 per mu, so I bid for ￥10 per mu and thought it was 
high enough for me to win, as local people used to be unwilling to invest (on 
collective forests). However, the win price was as high as ￥12 per mu, from a 
coalition of local villagers. (Deng from Hongtian Town, male, forest business 
man.) 
 
With strong investment and improved management, the output from and value of collective 
forestry increased.  For example, the annual output from the bamboo forests in the area 
increased from ￥100 per mu to ￥1100 per mu over this period. In addition,  16 new bamboo 
and wood processing enterprises were started in this period, where previously there had not 
been any.  These enterprises provided  130 new jobs, which further boosted local economic 
activity.  Based on these new  productivity levels, it has been estimated that the bamboo 
industry at Yong’an alone has a capacity for 44, 360 jobs annually, from planting to 
processing. This increases to nearly 58,000 jobs if the whole of the new timber industry is 
included, which amounts to approximately 55%of rural labor capacity in Yong’an City (Dai 
et al 2006).  
 
 Another major change brought about by the reform is that both farmers and the collective 
have received improved incomes. Before the Reform farmers earned very little from 
collective forests. In Hongtian Village for example, from 1997 to 2007 the average income 
increased from ￥2878 to ￥6400 per capita, with approximately half of this comprising 
income from work in the  collective forests. ;Over the same period the annual collective 
income increased from ￥153,000 to ￥450,000. The rapid increase in collective forestry 
income was common throughout Yong’an City, where annual farmer incomes from collective 
forestry increased from slightly more than ￥1000 per capita, to ￥2200 per capita, and the 
average collective income of AVs was increased from almost nothing before the Reform to 
￥163,000 in 2004 (Dai et at. 2006).  The impact of the reform was thus sufficient to mean 
that forestry contributed significantly to the economy of Yong’an City, amounting to over 20 
per cent of its GDP in 20043. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our research question concerned the extent to which the ‘Hongtian model’ represents a new 
approach to the distribution of common property rights that facilitates what Krier (2008) has 
described as the convergence of new conventions of behaviour towards that property. As the 
case study illustrates, there is evidence that this has indeed happened. In contrast to the 
collective approaches more commonly used to undermine the commons in favour of private 
property rights (Bell & Parchomovsky, 2007), the experience of decentralisation to 
individuals and exposure to conventional markets has provided a stable environment in which 
new behaviours can flourish. Quite apart from the more entrepreneurial behaviours 
                                                        
3 Figures all based on official reports and local statistical book. 
encouraged by access to timber markets, there is also evidence of pro-environmental 
behaviours with respect to the ecological forests, and pro-community behaviours with respect 
to fire preventing, logging practices and boundary disputes.  In contrast to conventional views 
that common pool resources are only really suited to the needs of land-poor people who have 
limited access to private capital (Chattopadhyay, 2008), the Hongtian case suggests quite the 
opposite: that in a supportive environment, common pool resources can release people from 
poverty rather than consigning them to it. 
 
What makes for successful collective action has been widely discussed, particularly by 
Ostrom and colleagues (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). The 
experience of Hongtian Village is generally in accordance with the key issues identified in 
Figure 1, such as clearly defined property rights boundaries and sufficient authority for those 
exercising the rights. However, what should be emphasized is that there are no pre-designed 
standards for specific outcomes from collective action. Rather, the case study findings do 
suggest that more attention should be paid to the process of transformation. This is partly 
because there can be all sorts of hidden costs that can render apparently simple standards 
unworkable (Demsetz, 1983), and partly because processes that offer stability and gradual 
change allow cultures to shift organically, with those involved having the time and incentive 
to adapt. This was particularly apparent in Hongtian Village, where the villagers were willing 
to meet regularly to discuss and agree changes. As Krier (2008) has suggested, this process of 
gradual change allows even fundamental transformations – such as the overlay of individual 
rights on common pool resources – to happen in a performative way in which practice and 
experience underpins people’s expectations about the potential benefits of change. There are 
limits to this, of course, related to the extent to which the process leads to improvements; 
Krier (2008) does observe that convergence of pro-community behaviours of the type seen in 
Hongtian Village generally only occur in the transformation of simple systems in cases of 
abundance. There can be little doubt that the Hongtian model reflects this. 
 
In terms of the advantages of the Hongtian model over conventional collective management, 
collective action of the type experienced in Hongtian Village is efficient in reducing the 
information asymmetry between policy makers and the local villagers. The failure of the 
previous top-down approach to forest management does not necessarily mean that it was not 
good enough, per se, but that it has proved impossible for policy makers to secure relevant 
information in varied local settings. This has tended to mean that top-down policies are 
insufficiently detailed and aware of local issues, particularly in preventing privileged elites 
from securing benefits for themselves. In addition, governments face high costs of plan 
implementation and monitoring without villagers’ involvement. In contrast, collective action 
can avoid these kinds of information and cost asymmetry. In Hongtian’s case, the villagers 
knew every claim that might be utilized by others, and they were able to place detailed 
enough requirements on those claims to prevent them from impeding the process of change. 
It was also found that once villagers are authorized to make their own decisions they 
automatically become part of the monitoring system. Finally, it was clearly important that the 
collective action mechanism provided a platform for the villagers to negotiate with each 
other, and to make changes to the implementation plan where required.  
 
The case study also suggested that collective action of the type undertaken in Hongtian 
Village is flexible enough to maximize the value of the common pool natural resources. For 
instance, the distribution of the use rights to the collective forests was much more 
complicated than the earlier process of distributing rights to arable lands. The first point is 
that the physical characteristics of the land are more variable in the forests than one the flatter 
arable lands. Also, while the arable lands could easily be divided into pieces with clear 
boundaries, the small forest lots (of typically less than 1/3 hectares in Hongtian Village) could 
not be marked out with such clarity, particularly where there were mature trees growing on 
the plots. Finally, all the growing crops could be removed before the distribution of arable 
lands, but the distribution of forest lands had to include the timber, which made the boundary 
issue much more controversial. The approach to collective action used in Hongtian allowed 
these issues to be addressed, particularly where the distribution of the forest lands was 
focused on the Production Team level or the Villager Group level. Indeed, in many cases the 
E-Boards preferred to sell the rights to harvest and to distribute the benefits in terms of cash 
rather than getting into protracted boundary disputes. This indicates both the villagers’ ability 
to judge the cost and benefits among different options and chose the best one for them, and 
also the flexibility of the distribution system that gave them the option to choose.  
 
However, successful collective action will not automatically succeed, even in Hongtian’s 
case, without some macro political conditions. As we found out, Hongtian was not the first 
one to distribute forest use rights by collective action. As early as 1992, Gaoping Village in 
Yong’an City secretly distributed the rights to its forests to local households. Even though the 
illegal logging stopped, this distribution did not bring great changes in forestry development, 
largely because the management culture had not had time to change and those involved felt 
that they still had to worry about the safety of their properties. Therefore, governments, 
especially local government, played a key role in the collective action witnessed in Hongtian 
Village. Having been a pioneer forestry county authorized by State Forestry Administration, 
the local government had implemented an increasingly decentralized policy since the 
beginning of the 1990s. Regulations on timber transport, transactions, and so on were 
loosened gradually. Associated taxes and fees were greatly reduced, which provided enough 
profits for villagers to work in the forests. During the Reform, the government also provided 
strong support via interaction with the collective and villagers, such as technical support (e.g. 
locating forests boundaries), conflict resolution (both informal and official), and official 
certification, all of which were vital for efficient collective action. As this suggests, 
experience from Hongtian Village indicates that government should alter the way in which it 
sees its role in common natural resource management, from direct intervention to effective 
interaction with local villagers. 
 
Despite the overall success of the Hongtian model, there have been some unintended 
consequences caused by the collective action. In particular, there may well be a discrepancy 
between social and economic sustainability brought about by the small scale of household 
enterprise. Following the distribution of rights, the average household in Hongtian Village 
manages about 3 hectares, often located in more than 3 plots, meaning that it is impossible to 
generate any economies of scale. This means that most villagers are reluctant to invest in 
these small scale forestlands because of their low return. Those who did invest tended to plant 
fast-growing high-yield trees in order to make faster returns. However, these trees do not 
provide as much ecological service as local indigenous species, and may also cause 
considerable environmental problems in the future. This suggests that appropriate regulation 
is necessary to ensure the direction of collective action and that the Hongtian model requires 
improvement before it is effective in economic and environmental, as well as social, terms. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As Long et al. (2012) have observed, rural restructuring in China has been both dynamic and 
disruptive, with successive governments criticized for intensive intervention in economic 
development, especially at the local level. Even though the collective was authorized to have 
its own autonomy, the Village Committees acted as an extension of government agencies 
more than as an autonomous organization. Many conflicts in rural areas could not be resolved 
efficiently, and rural development was seriously lagging behind its urban counterpart, as well 
as the rural economies of other countries (see Long et al., 2012). While there are many 
factors involved, it is certainly clear that, with regard to forest lands in particular, the 
common pool status of collective forests allied to poor collective management practices 
contributed to the lack of rural development.  
 
From a national view, therefore, the application of a new approach to managing common 
forest resources, via a bottom-up collective community response, can be regarded as a 
seminal moment for China’s rural policy, certainly in social - and probably also in economic 
and environmental – terms. While being far from perfect, the ‘Hongtian model’ of slow-
paced, equitable, community-level reform has delivered what Krier (2008), in other contexts, 
has referred to as a series of individual actions that have converged to form new conventions 
of forest management behaviour. And it is this that is significant – that reform has been far 
less about changing the structure or direction of control than it has been about facilitating the 
agentive performance of individual families and communities in developing a new cultural 
approach to collective forest management. This is particularly significant given the 
continuing insecurity of tenure that has been widely experienced in China’s rural 
restructuring (Rao, et al, 2016). As our case study has illustrated, collective action of the type 
fostered in Hongtian Village is efficient not only in rebuilding common management of 
natural resources, but also in the distribution of management power. And the essence of this 
has been to authorize villagers, encourage them to get involved and to provide a frame of 
reference for their individual actions such that their expectation of success gives rise to 
cultural practices which underpin this expectation. Within this new culture, governments 
become facilitators of what are essentially private actions that support the continuation of a 
form of collective action – the essential bottom-up approach that has been so strongly 
advocated by those studying rural restructuring in China (see Long et al., 2012).  
 
However, there are still some challenges for the application of collective action in China. Due 
to rapid urbanization, rural communities are on the edge of survival. In some rural areas, 
farmers depend more and more on urban job opportunities and will only be willing to re-
engage with traditional occupations such as forestry if the rewards are high enough. Without 
the sustained participation of highly skilled farmers, the collective forest management 
reforms will not be sustainable, leading again to the possibility of unsustainable and illegal 
practices being resumed. And even where farmers are engaged, as in Hongtian Village, the 
reforms are incomplete, with most families trying to cope with small dispersed parcels of 
mixed quality woodland. Yet these problems should not detract from the lessons that have 
been learned, particularly about the significance of understanding the collective management 
of common pool resources as a predominantly cultural activity. In echoing Ostrom et al.’s 
(1999) findings, as well as those of recent studies (Behnke et al., 2016; Rasch et al., 2016; Vij 
& Narain, 2016) there is no single best way to organize the management of common pool 
resources. However, this paper has shown that there are ways of approaching the organization 
that allow individual agency to work within a supportive administrative structure such that 
the identity of the property rights being deployed is secondary to the culture of practice that is 
established between those who participate in the scheme. While implying, in a conventional 
property rights sense, growing insecurity (see Rao, et al. 2016), the culture of practice has 
become so strongly engrained that it is this, rather than the rights claims themselves, that 
provides the security and continuity needed by the villagers. This finding has certainly had 
traction within China; it is equally a lesson to be learnt in addressing the future administration 
of common pool resources under any political or cultural regime. 
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